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Consumer awareness and the use of payment media: 
evidence from young Finnish consumers 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 2/2008 
Ari Hyytinen – Tuomas Takalo 




In the market for payment media, some consumers use only one medium when 
paying for their point-of-sale transactions, while others use many. This pattern 
reflects the diffusion of new payment media, because a payment method 
innovation is typically first used simultaneously with the established methods. We 
study the use of multiple payment media by employing data on young Finnish 
consumers. We find that the use of multiple payment media is directly related to 
consumer awareness and that not controlling for the endogeneity of awareness can 
bias its effect downwards. These results suggest that increasing consumer 
awareness may have been underlying the rise of debit card use around the world. 
It could also speed up the adoption of new means of payment, such electronic 
money and mobile payments. To the extent that antitrust concerns in the market 
for payment media stem from the lack of information, improving consumer 
awareness could be a remedy. 
 
Keywords: payment media, consumer awareness, adoption of financial technology 
 
JEL classification numbers: G200, E590  
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Maksutapoja koskeva informaatio ja maksutapojen 
käyttö Suomessa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 2/2008 
Ari Hyytinen – Tuomas Takalo 




Jotkut kuluttajat käyttävät vain yhtä tapaa ostoksiensa maksamiseen, toiset taas 
useampia. Tällainen käyttäytyminen heijastaa uusien maksutapojen leviämistä, 
koska yleensä uusia maksutapoja käytetään ensin samanaikaisesti perinteisempien 
maksutapojen kanssa. Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan uusien maksutapojen 
leviämiseen vaikuttavia tekijöitä nuoria suomalaisia koskevan aineiston avulla. 
Kuluttajien saama informaatio uusista maksutavoista on tutkimuksen mukaan yksi 
maksutapojen leviämisen keskeinen selittäjä. Tavallisesti maksutapojen käyttöä 
selittävät esimerkiksi koulutus ja tulotaso, mutta tämän tutkimuksen mukaan ne 
ovat vähemmän tärkeitä. Naiset käyttävät merkittävästi useampia maksutapoja 
kuin miehet. Tulokset viittaavat siihen, että kuluttajien tietoisuuden kohentaminen 
voisi merkittävästi nopeuttaa uusien maksutapojen, kuten sähköisen rahan ja 
mobiilimaksamisen, leviämistä. Kuluttajien tietoisuuden parantaminen saattaisi 
myös vähentää kilpailuongelmia maksuvälinemarkkinoilla. 
 
Avainsanat: maksuvälineet, kuluttajien tietoisuus, uuden teknologian käyttöönotto 
rahoituspalvelusektorilla 
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The technological breakthroughs and regulatory reforms of the past decades have 
brought payment media to the forefront of business, social and political interest. 
Spreading of debit and credit cards has thoroughly changed the way people pay 
for good and services (see, eg Humphrey, 2004, Klee, 2006a, and Amromin and 
Chakravorti, 2007). New payment instruments, such as smart cards and those 
embedded in mobile phones, are entering commercial use and making money 
more digital and less tangible. The new payment media also hold a promise to 
enhance the access of the poorest to basic financial services, especially in 
developing countries. But the development is not free of concerns. As money has 
become less tangible, consumer protection authorities worry that people spend 
and borrow too much, whereas central banks worry that the traditional instruments 
of monetary policy become obsolete. The increased concentration of payment 
card industry has alarmed competition policy authorities, who have begun to 
scrutinize card platforms’ practices (see, eg Hunt, 2003, and Evans and 
Schmalensee, 2005, chapter 12). 
  Whether and how benefits and concerns from digitalization of money 
materialize depend on the diffusion of new payment media. Monetary history is 
full of examples where new payment media have taken off only slowly if not at 
all. It is not well understood what hampers the adoption of these financial 
innovations, notably because of a lack of systematic evidence.
1 It can be hard to 
obtain consumer-level data on early adopters of emerging payment media. In this 
paper we take advantage of a special feature of the payment media market that 
some consumers only use one medium, while others use simultaneously many. 
Such payment behavior essentially reflects the diffusion of new payment media, 
because even the most recent major innovations, coins, checks, paper money, and 
the payment card, have long been used in chorus with the previously established 
payment media (Evans and Schmalensee, 2005).
2 
  We focus on the role of consumer awareness in the use of multiple payment 
media. Previous research has shown that the rate of adoption of new payment 
methods varies with consumer demographic and financial characteristics such as 
age, education, income and home-ownership status (eg Carow and Staten, 1999, 
Mantel, 2000, Stavins, 2001, and Mester, 2003) and that localized feedback loops 
between consumers and merchants matter (Rysman, 2007). Holding consumer 
                                                 
1 See Frame and White (2004) for a review of the scant empirical literature on financial 
innovations and their diffusion. 
2 This is one indication of sluggish diffusion of new payment media innovations. For example, 
payment cards were introduced in the 1950s, but only over the past two decades they have begun 
to replace checks and, to lesser extend, cash (see, eg Humphrey, 2004, and Amromin and 
Chakravorti, 2007). Similarly, while mobile and smart money are (finally) spreading, the slow 
pace of change has been considered puzzling.  
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characteristics and merchant acceptance constant, pricing and information 
provision are the main instruments that policy makers and issuers can adopt to 
boost consumer use of modern payment media. While there is growing evidence 
that consumers react strongly to explicit pricing of paying (Humphrey, Kim and 
Vale, 2001, and Borzekowski, Kiser and Ahmed, 2006), the quantitative 
importance of consumer awareness in the market for payment media is not 
known. Nor do we know much about how sensitive consumers’ payment behavior 
is to information provision about payment media. 
  The available evidence on the importance of consumer awareness in the 
market for payment media is either indirect or qualitative: Chakravorti (2004) 
argues that awareness is needed for wide-spread acceptance of stored value cards. 
Evans and Schmalensee (2005) conjecture that Visa’s massive advertisement 
campaigns to foster consumer awareness of its debit products in the 1990s have 
contributed to the rise of signature debit in the US. Marketing and industrial 
economics literature suggests that providing information about any new product 
should foster its diffusion, especially if the adoption is held back by non-monetary 
costs, such as the costs arising from imperfect consumer information, and learning 
and searching costs. But, prior to our study, virtually no quantitative evidence 
exists on the effects of the information provision on the adoption of new payment 
media.
3 
  There is a link from our study to the literature on multihoming in the market 
for payment media (see, eg Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006). In this literature, a 
consumer is said to be engaged in multihoming if she carries, say multiple 
different brands of credit cards, whereas we focus on the use of multiple different 
methods of payment. Our paper is also complementary to the emerging literature 
on the determinants of the use of one payment media versus another at the point 
of sale in the US (eg Carow and Staten, 1999, Borzekowski and Kiser, 2006, 
Klee, 2006b, Fusaro, 2007, and Zinman, 2007). This literature has begun to 
produce important insights on what drives the discrete choice between using 
‘paper or plastic’ and ‘debit or credit’ by emphasizing the differences across 
various payment media and documenting how payment choice depends on the 
characteristics of transactions. In contrast we emphasize what drives the number 
of different payment method used and how this payment behavior depends on 
consumer awareness. In this respect a close paper to ours is Klee (2006a) who 
addresses the question of the family’s use of multiple payment media. 
  To study how the use of multiple payment media and consumer awareness are 
related in the market for payment media we exploit some unique features of the 
survey data on young Finnish consumers available to us. 
                                                 
3 An important exception is Hayashi and Klee (2003), who provide related evidence by showing 
that the adoption of electronic payment media correlates with the adoption of other new 
technologies.  
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•  The Finnish market for payment media is by international standards advanced 
and Finns have for long relied on an access to electronic payment networks 
when paying point-of-sale. Because young consumers typically show a great 
rate of adoption of new payment media (Carow and Staten, 1999, Mantel, 
2000, Humphrey et al, 2001, Stavins, 2001, Stix, 2003), we can study how the 
behaviour of the most likely early adopters of new payment media is affected 
by information provision. 
•  The data contains direct measures of the point-of-sale paying habits of 
individual consumers. The measures allow us to generate a dependent variable 
at the level of individual consumers that distinguishes the point-of-sale paying 
from settling bills and the actual use of the payment media from having a 
passive access to them. 
•  As Guiso and Jappelli (2005) point out, consumer awareness in financial 
markets can take many guises and be an elusive concept. It can be both about 
the existence and characteristics of payment media. Our data include a series 
of questions capturing the consumers’ exposure to the provision of 
information about financial services and payment media. The data also yield 
instruments, which allow us to control for the potential endogeneity of 
consumer awareness. 
•  Our consumer-level data contains extensive demographic and socio-economic 
information, and an unusual degree of detail on consumers’ banking 
relationship. This provides a wide-ranging list of consumer characteristics that 
in some respects goes beyond the standard control variables used in the 
literature. 
 
We find that more than half of the young Finnish customers in our sample use 
more than one payment media when paying at the point-of-sale and that this use 
of multiple payment media is closely related to the decision to use debit card in 
addition to cash. However, while an informed consumer is more likely to use 
multiple payment media, the link from awareness to debit use is subtle. It turns 
out that those who use only one payment method use cash irrespective of their 
awareness and that while awareness induces a shift towards using many payment 
methods, the shift means that some begin to use debit as their primary method of 
paying, whereas the others begin to use it as their secondary method. The effect of 
awareness on the probability of using multiple payment media is quantitatively 
large, especially if the potential endogeneity of consumer awareness is controlled 
for. We also show that the effect of consumer awareness on use of multiple 
payment media survives a number of robustness checks, including using an 
alternative measure of consumer awareness and methods of estimation. 
  In the next section, we describe the institutional environment and some 
special characteristics of the Finnish market of payment media that make Finland 
a neat case for our study. In section 3 we describe our data and the construction of  
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variables. We go trough the basic estimations, their results, and robustness tests in 
section 4. In section 5 we address the potential endogeneity of consumer 
awareness. The concluding section includes a discussion of the implications of our 
findings for the adoption of new payment media. 
 
 
2 Institutional  environment
4 
The Finnish market for payment media has some distinctive features that simplify 
our study and some profound differences with the much-studied US market of 
payment media (see, eg Ausubel, 1991 and Humphrey, Pulley and Vesala, 2000, 
Klee, 2006a,b, and Fusaro, 2007 for a description of the US market). 
  The Finnish market for payment media is relatively advanced, for Finns have 
for some time now relied on accessing electronic payment networks at the point-
of-sale (see, eg Amromin and Chakravorti, 2007, for a cross-country comparison). 
Checks disappeared from consumer trade in the 1980s, and debit cards became 
subsequently popular: In 2002, they accounted for 2/3 of the value of all card 
payments.
5 In other words, the shift away from checks towards increasing use of 
debit cards occurred in Finland much earlier than in the US and many other 
countries. 
  The use of cash is decreasing rapidly. Between 1999 and 2003, the use of cash 
as a way of paying for daily consumer goods and services decreased by 18% (13 
percentage points, to 58%). Although it still is relatively common in point-of-sale 
transactions, the ratio of currency in circulation to GDP, about 1.8% in 2002, is in 
Finland among the lowest in the world. Moreover, a special feature of the Finnish 
market is that the use of cash is almost invariantly preceded by the use of an 
ATM: The entire currency in circulation (2,4 billion euros) goes through the 
ATMs seven times a year, and getting ‘cash back’ when paying by a card (say, at 
a retail store) is rare. The use of cash without first accessing one’s bank account 
via an ATM is a habit that is restricted to the senior citizens that have never 
learned to use ATMs. For the rest, using ATMs is easy, since virtually everyone 
has a banking account where incomes are credited directly and an ATM 
                                                 
4 Most of the industry details come from the various publications of the Finnish Bankers’ 
Association and the Bank of Finland. 
5 Various surveys show that between 1999 and 2003, the use of debit cards as the most common 
way of paying for daily consumer goods and services increased from 17% to 30%.  
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(compatible) card. The coverage of the ATM networks is rather extensive, and the 
networks of different banks allow for roaming.
6 
  In Finland, credit and debit cards appear to be closer substitutes than in the 
US. This means that studying the discrete choice between ‘debit versus credit’, 
which has been one of the research focuses in the US (see, eg Fusaro, 2007, and 
Zinman, 2007), is less of interest to us. Besides the four margins (acceptance, 
security, portability and time costs) in which credit and debit cards are close 
substitutes also in the US, there are additional reasons for their substitutability in 
the Finnish market: First, Finns in general and young Finns in particular use their 
credit cards primarily for paying and not for borrowing: Our data (described more 
closely in section 4) tells us that in 2002, 37% of the young had an outstanding 
credit balance, but only for 5% it originated from payment card borrowing (for 
4% from credit cards).
7 Instead of borrowing, the young have other, convenience 
related motivations to use a credit card, such as a Visa or a MasterCard. One of 
them is the desire to use it abroad in the point-of-sale transactions. Further, there 
are very few ‘revolvers’ in Finland who do not pay their credit card balance in full 
by the payment due date. Second, the benefit of float (ie, interest-free loan) that a 
typical Finnish consumer (who pays the balance in full) foregoes if she uses debit 
instead of credit, appears to be small at least in the euro era (from the start of 
1999).
8 Third, at the time when our data was collected, there were little, if any, 
rewards such as rebates or airline miles available for a debit or a credit card user. 
  The Finnish market for payment media is concentrated, because the few main 
deposit banks that dominate the banking sector are the main issuers of payment 
media. Because the issuers of payment media are relatively homogenous the 
payment media, their pricing, and the ways of providing them with customers tend 
to be similar across the issuers, at least after controlling for the banking 
relationships of consumers. 
  The pricing of the payment media is also quite simple (see Koskinen, 2001). 
At least one ATM or payment card is often automatically attached to a banking 
account as a part of a banking service package. The packages can include various 
payment media, whose pricing hence depends on the pricing of the banking 
service packages. Their pricing in turn is tied to the age of a consumer. It is 
                                                 
6 The reason for the extensive ATM networks is that the Finnish banking sector was heavily 
regulated until the late 1980s. Because both deposit and loan interest rates were regulated, the 
banking groups competed by the scope of their service network. The last phase of the service 
competition was the introduction of ATMs. The deregulation and the subsequent banking crisis of 
the early 1990s actually first intensified the competition through ATM networks, because the 
banks replaced their branches by a set of ATMs to cut down costs. 
7 For the rest, the loan was either a mortgage or a student loan. Borrowing via payment cards is 
directly related to age even within the young. 
8 We do not have exact figures. Zinman (2007) computes the foregone float to be about 3$ for a 
‘typical’ US customer.  
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typical that the basic packages are free of charge until the age of 26, which applies 
to most individuals in our data. 
 
 
3  Data and definition of variables 
3.1 Data 
The data for our analysis come from a survey conducted by the Finnish Bankers’ 
Association between the 21
st February and 5
th March, 2002. The primary aim of 
the survey was to collect data on the consumption habits of young Finns and their 
views about banking and financial products and services. The survey was based 
on a random sample of 1004 young adults aged between 15 and 28. We use the 
entire sample, which represents approximately 1/900 of the total population in the 
age group. 
  The data are rich in detail concerning the young adults’ demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics, financial affairs, banking relationships, and 
information about banking products and financial affairs, including payment 
media. The data also include information about the use of various payment media 
in retail transactions. 
 
 
3.2  Definition of variables 
Use of payment media 
 
The survey contains the following three questions, Q1–Q3, about how the young 
pay for their purchases and consumption of services:
9 
 
  Q1: What is the most typical way you pay for your purchases or consumption 
of services? i) cash, ii) debit card, iii) combined debit-credit card, iv) credit 
card, v) debit or credit card issued by a retailer, vi) Visa Electron, vii) stored 
value card , viii) GSM or WAP phone, ix) by other means, how? (specify); 
 
  Q2: What about the second most typical way? Is it i) cash, ii) debit card, 
iii) combined debit-credit card, iv) credit card, v) debit or credit card issued 
by a retailer, vi) Visa Electron, vii) stored value card, viii) GSM or WAP 
phone, ix) by other means, how? (specify), x) there is no second way; 
 
                                                 
9 Translation from Finnish by the authors.  
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  Q3: Is there yet another way you pay for your purchases or consumption of 
services? If yes, is it i) cash, ii) debit card, iii) combined debit-credit card, 
iv) credit card, v) debit or credit card issued by a retailer, vi) Visa Electron, 
vii) stored value card, viii) GSM or WAP phone, ix) by other means, how? 
(specify), x) there are no additional ways. 
 
These questions allow measuring the number of different payment media a young 
consumer uses and characterizing which media she uses when paying for her 
purchases or consumption of services. Note that questions Q1–Q3 identify 
virtually all the payment media consumers could use when paying for 
consumption or services at the point-of-sale in Finland. Even if a payment 
medium were not properly identified, the respondents had three possibilities to 
identify such a medium by themselves. But no one did. Moreover, questions Q1–
Q3 concern actually using a payment medium, not having an access to it (ie 
carrying it passively in one’s wallet). We therefore need not to worry about card 
owners who never use their cards.
10 
  We let ni denote the number of different payment media consumer i uses. We 





The previous literature unfortunately provides little help in choosing a proxy for 
consumer awareness, ai.
11 We measure it based on a series of questions included 
the survey that concern the provision of information about payment media. The 
questions were introduced as follows: 
 
  Q4: I will next list a number of different banking services or products. Please 
indicate for each item whether you have either received or been offered (i) a 
lot of information, (ii) some information, or (iii) no information. 
 
We code an indicator variable that equals 1, if the responded chose (i) to items 
{‘Debit and credit cards’, ‘Other loans, such as consumer credit and borrowing 
using cards’, ‘Transaction accounts, ie those designed for frequent, daily usage’, 
‘Ways of paying bills’}. The value of the indicator is zero otherwise, ie, only ‘a lot 
of information’ is counted as awareness. 
                                                 
10 Yet another useful feature of the survey is that just before the questions of the use of payment 
media in retail transactions were presented, the respondents had been asked about their habits of 
paying for their bills. The questions should thus capture the young adults’ payment habits in point-
of-sale-transactions instead of their bill-paying habits. 
11 On measuring consumer awareness in financial markets, see Guiso and Jappelli (2005). Lusardi 
and Mitchell (2007) provide an overview of a related literature on financial literacy and investor 
sophistication.  
14 
  The rationale for our definition of ai is that a consumer’s awareness of the 
existence and characteristics of payment media is likely to be directly related to 
the amount of information the consumer has been offered about them. The amount 
should, in turn, be directly related to the systematic and unsystematic forms of 
information provision by the various issuers of payment media. For now, we 
maintain the assumption of exogenous awareness. 
  Although our measure of consumer awareness is certainly imperfect, we can 
show that our results hold in instrumental variable estimations that allow for a 
measurement error in ai. We also establish the robustness of our results with 





We construct two sets of variables. The first set consists of demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics: sex (SEXi = 1 if the respondent is female), age in 
years (AGEi), age squared (AGESQi), employment status (EMPi = if employed; 
UNEMPi  = if unemployed, the omitted category is for students), level of 
completed or on-going education (HIGHi = 1, if university, MEDIUMi = 1 if high 
school or equivalent, the omitted category is for those with elementary school 
education), household type (NOHOUSEHi  = 1, if lives with parents), type of 
family (CHILDRENi = 1, if has at least one child), residential area (CITYi = 1 if 
lives in a city with more than 30 000 inhabitants), geographic region of residence 
(WESTi = 1, EASTi = 1, NORTHi = 1, if lives in these parts of Finland, the 
omitted category represents the respondents living in south), income (INCOMEi, 
in thousands of EUR), income squared (INCOMESQi), the type of real wealth 
(RWEALTHi = 1 if owns a real estate, a house or a condominium), financial 
wealth (FWEALTHi = 1, if has savings in deposit or savings accounts, if owns 
stocks, shares of mutual funds, bonds, private pension insurance, or if has made 
other financial investments), and liquid wealth (LWEALTHi = 1, if has savings in 
transaction accounts). 
  The previous literature suggests that demographic and education variables 
should be included to control for heterogeneity in adoption costs and consumption 
behavior (eg Carow and Staten, 1999, Mantel, 2000, Stavins, 2001, and Mester, 
2003). Similarly, the literature suggests that we should control for income and the 
type of wealth, because they affect consumption patterns and measure how 
relevant fixed monetary adoption costs are. Dummies for the residential area and 
region aim at acknowledging the two-sided nature of payment media market and 
capturing related adoption determinants considered by Attanasio, Luigi and Japelli 
(2002), Stix (2003) and Rysman (2007), such as the number of ATM points in the 
area of residence and regional variation in the acceptance of payment media by 
retailers. They also capture other regional variation affecting use of payment  
15 
media. For example, the determinants of consumer awareness uncovered by Guiso 
and Jappelli (2005) include geographical variations in the intensity of social 
networks and learning as well as in the costs of spreading information about 
payment media. 
  The second set of control variables is more unusual and comes from the 
variables depicting consumers’ relationship to their deposit banks: Identity of a 
consumer’s main bank (MBANK_hi = 1, if principally uses the services of bank h, 
h = 1, 2, …, 6, the omitted category is for those who principally use the services 
of bank 7), use of other banks (NOSBANKi = 1, if uses the services of other 
banks in addition to the main bank), choice of the main bank (BCHOICEi = 1, if 
the main bank has been chosen by the respondent herself and not, eg, by her 
parents or spouse), duration of the relationship with the main bank (BLENGHTi = 
1 if has been a customer of the current main bank since her birth), membership in 
the main bank’s youth club (BCLUBi = 1 if a member), and recent switch of main 
bank (SWBANKi = 1 if has changed the main bank over the past 12 months). 
  Controlling for the banking relationships is quite natural because of the 
prominent role of the deposit banks in the Finnish market for payment media (see 
section 2). We trust that these regressors reflect heterogeneity in adoption costs: 
The MBANK_hi-dummies and NOSBANKi should capture, for example, 
differences in the pricing of various cards and marketing strategies across the 
banks. We can moreover conjecture that BCLUBi proxies the initial level of 
consumer awareness about payment media, as a former member of a bank’s youth 
club should be relatively well informed about banking products and services. 
  We introduce the two sets of controls sequentially into the model to ensure 
that our results are not driven by potential (unmodelled) endogeneity of some of 
the control variables in the second set of regressors. Variable SWBANKi is for 
example potentially endogenous, because consumers could self-select, ie, switch 





4.1 Descriptive  statistics 
The summary statistics are presented in Table 4.1. They show that the respondents 
are on average 21 years old and have annual income of about 8100 EUR. A bit 
more than half of them are female, some 60% of them are students and around 
                                                 
12 Besides the control variables described here we have tried several other groupings and sets. Our 
results are robust to such alternative specifications as also the robustness tests of the next section 
indicate.  
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28% have a university degree or are studying for one. The average of ai, which is 
our indicator for consumer awareness, is 0.7. 
  The table also indicates that consumers use multiple payment media but their 
number is rather restricted. The mean of the dummy variable USEMANYi is 53%, 
which indicates that a bit more than half of the young Finns use more than one 
payment medium in their point-of-sale transactions. The count variable, ni, varies 
from 1 to 3 and has a mean of 1.6.
13 
 
Table 4.1  Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
n 946 1.59 0.61 1 3
USEMANY 946 0.53 0.50 0 1
a 946 0.70 0.46 0 1
INCOME 946 8.14 9.64 0 37.80
AGE 946 21.22 3.99 15 28
SEX 946 0.51 0.50 0 1
LIVCITY 946 0.48 0.50 0 1
WEST 946 0.38 0.48 0 1
EAST 946 0.12 0.33 0 1
NORTH 946 0.13 0.34 0 1
EMP 946 0.32 0.47 0 1
UNEMP 946 0.07 0.25 0 1
HIGH 946 0.28 0.45 0 1
MEDIUM 946 0.62 0.49 0 1
NOHOUSEH 946 0.44 0.50 0 1
CHILDREN 946 0.09 0.28 0 1
RWEALTH 946 0.14 0.35 0 1
FWEALTH 946 0.27 0.44 0 1
LWEALTH 946 0.25 0.44 0 1
MBANK_1 946 0.33 0.47 0 1
MBANK_2 946 0.39 0.49 0 1
MBANK_3 946 0.06 0.23 0 1
MBANK_4 946 0.15 0.36 0 1
MBANK_5 946 0.02 0.14 0 1
MBANK_6 946 0.03 0.17 0 1
NOSBANK 946 0.74 0.44 0 1
BCHOICE 931 0.36 0.48 0 1
BLENGTH 849 0.64 0.48 0 1
BCLUB 937 0.57 0.50 0 1
SWBANK 934 0.03 0.16 0 1
 
  Note: Data source is ‘Nuorisotutkimus 2002’ -survey of the 
Finnish Banker’s Association 
 
 
Figure 4.1 displays the distribution of ni conditional on ai. The figure suggests that 
use of multiple payment media and consumer awareness are not independent, as 
consumer awareness clearly shifts the distribution of ni to the right. As many as 
                                                 
13 One respondent used four payment methods. We recoded her answer to equal three.  
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65.4% of the uninformed consumers (with ai = 0) use only one payment medium, 
while the corresponding percentage for the informed is 39.1%. Put differently, 
83% of those who use many payment methods are better informed. To formally 
assess for the presence of dependence between ni and awareness, we compute 
Pearson’s χ
2-test. The test for independence obtains a value of 55.75 (d.f. = 2), 
which allows us to firmly reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. 
 
Figure 4.1  Use of multiple payment media by the uninformed 
      (a = 0) and the informed (a = 1) 
 
























a = 0 a = 1  
 
  Note: Data source is ‘Nuorisotutkimus 2002’ -survey of the 
Finnish Banker’s Association 
 
 
Figure 4.2 displays the distribution of the most typical way of paying (based on 
answers to Q1), conditional on ni and ai. Approximately 3/4 of the respondents 
keeps cash as their most typical way of paying for their purchases or consumption 
of services and awareness seems to have little to do with the consumers’ 
preference for cash. In particular, if a young only uses a single payment method 
(ni = 1), she uses cash almost certainly. The figure also shows that of those who 
use many payment methods (ni > 1), more than half regards cash as their first 
choice: A simple t-test allows us to reject at 5% significance level (but not at 1% 
level) the null hypothesis that the binary variable indicating that the most typical 
way of paying is cash, has a mean of 0.5 (conditional on ni > 1). Awareness, or 
lack of it, is not associated with the use of cash as the primary method of payment, 
conditional on ni = 1 or ni > 1. Pearson’s χ
2-tests confirm that the null hypothesis 
of independence cannot rejected in either case. 
  
18 
Figure 4.2  The most typical way of paying by the uninformed 
      (a = 0) and the informed (a = 1) 
 



























a = 0 a = 1  
 
 
Figure 4.3a and 4.3b takes a closer look at the methods of paying among the 
young who use many payment methods. Figure 4.3a displays the distribution of 
the most typical way of paying (based on answers to Q1), conditional on ni > 1 
and the first choice not being cash. Figure 4.3b displays, in turn, the distribution 
of the second most typical way of paying (based on answers to Q2), conditional 
on ni > 1 and the first choice being cash. These figures show that debit card is the 
most typical way of paying among those who use many payment media and who 
do not use cash as their primary method of payment. Together with Visa Electron 
(which from the consumer’s point of view is close to a regular debit card), debit 
card is also the second most typical way of paying among those who use many 
payment media and whose first choice is cash. Pearson’s χ
2-tests indicate that 
these (conditional) choices are not related to awareness, as the null hypothesis of 
independence cannot rejected in either case.
14 
 
                                                 
14 While not shown in the figures, we can also report that cash is the second most typical way of 
paying, conditional on n > 1 and the first choice not being cash. To be specific, about 95% of these 
young use cash.  
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Figure 4.3a  The most typical way of paying, conditional on n 
      and the first choice not being cash 
 
The most typical way of paying, 


























a = 0 a = 1  
 
 
Figure 4.3b  The most typical way of paying, conditional on n 
      and the first choice being cash 
 
The second most typical way of paying, 























a = 0 a = 1  
 
 
Taken together, Figures 4.1–4.3a,b suggest that awareness is correlated with use 
of multiple payment media and, while a priori it needed not be the case, this 
behavior is closely related to the decision to use debit card either as a primary or 
secondary method of payment in addition to cash. However, the relationship 
between awareness and debit card use is nuanced: Those who only use one 
payment method use cash irrespective of their awareness and while awareness  
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induces a shift towards the use of multiple media, the shift means that some begin 
to use debit as their primary method of paying, whereas the others begin to use it 
as their secondary method of paying. 
 
 
4.2 Econometric  analysis 
To provide quantitative evidence on the relationship between the use of multiple 
payment media and information provision, we estimate a number of regression 
models. In these models, the dependent variable is the use of multiple payment 
media (ni or USEMANYi) and the main interest is in estimating the effect of 
consumer awareness (ai) on the usage. For now, we maintain the assumption of 
exogenous consumer awareness. 
  In column (1) and (2) of Panel A of Table 4.2 we present the results of 
Ordered-Probit (O-Probit) and quasi maximum-likelihood Poisson (QML-
Poisson) estimations of models in which ni is the dependent variable and in which 
only the first set of control variables is included.
15 In column (3), the dependent 
variable is USEMANYi and the method of estimation Probit. Panel B reports the 
results for the same models, but with both sets of controls included. We use the 
standard Huber-White sandwich estimator to obtain a heteroscedasticity-robust 
variance-covariance matrix. 
  The results of Table 4.2 show that the dummy for consumer awareness 
obtains a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 1% level, 
irrespective of the estimation method and the included set of control variables. 
This finding confirms that the use of multiple payment media by a Finnish young 
is related to her awareness. The Probit results allow us to compute that holding the 
other variables constant, the difference between Prob(USEMANYi = 1 | ai = 1) 
and Prob(USEMANYi = 1 | ai = 0) is on average 12.6 percentage points (= 
56.6%–44.0%). This difference is not negligible when compared eg to the mean 
of USEMANYi. 
  As to other determinants of ni and USEMANYi, they are mostly in line with 
expectations. Propensity to use many payment media is increasing in INCOMEi, 
but the positive relation begins to weaken after a threshold. Financial asset 
ownership also increases the likelihood of using multiple payment media. If the 
findings are not entirely driven by different consumption patterns of the affluent, 
they may also indicate that the young care about the monetary costs of adoption. 
As the coefficients of SEXi and HIGHi suggests, females, university students and 
                                                 
15 An advantage of the Poisson quasi-likelihood method is that the consistency of estimation 
requires only a correct specification of the (conditional) mean function (see, eg Wooldridge, 
1997). Moreover, in an earlier working paper version (Hyytinen and Takalo, 2004) we show how 
such a conditional mean of a count (Poisson) regression model can be derived from a simple 
consumer payment behaviour model of the Baumol-Tobin type and given structural interpretation.  
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graduates use more payment media than their otherwise identical counterparts. 
From Panel B we can observe that a considered choice of bank relationship and 
membership in a bank’s youth club also have an effect on the likelihood of using 
multiple payment media. 
 
Table 4.2  Regression results: exogenous ai 
 
PANEL A
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
a 0.37 0.10 *** 0.09 0.02 *** 0.42 0.10 ***
INCOME 0.04 0.01 *** 0.01 3.9E-03 *** 0.04 0.02 ***
INCOMESQ -8.0E-04 4.7E-04 * -2.2E-04 1.2E-04 * -1.1E-03 5.2E-04 **
AGE 0.38 0.18 ** 0.11 0.04 ** 0.18 0.20
AGESQ -0.01 3.8E-03 * -1.8E-03 9.5E-04 * -1.7E-03 4.4E-03
SEX 0.24 0.09 *** 0.06 0.02 *** 0.30 0.10 ***
LIVCITY 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.24 0.10 **
WEST -0.11 0.10 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.11
EAST 0.07 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.16
NORTH 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.15
EMP 0.03 0.14 5.7E-03 0.04 0.11 0.16
UNEMP -0.07 0.17 -0.02 0.05 0.06 0.20
HIGH 0.77 0.25 *** 0.17 0.06 *** 0.86 0.27 ***
MEDIUM 0.50 0.22 ** 0.10 0.05 ** 0.53 0.22 **
NOHOUSEH -0.05 0.13 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.13
CHILDREN 0.08 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.19
RWEALTH 0.21 0.13 * 0.06 0.03 * 0.32 0.16 **
FWEALTH 0.30 0.10 *** 0.08 0.02 *** 0.28 0.11 **





Note 1: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level;  * significant at the 10% level
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Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
a 0.33 0.10 *** 0.08 0.03 *** 0.36 0.11 ***
INCOME 0.04 0.02 *** 0.01 4.1E-03 *** 0.05 0.02 *
INCOMESQ 0.00 0.00 ** -2.8E-04 1.3E-04 ** -1.3E-03 5.8E-04 *
AGE 0.16 0.19 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.21
AGESQ 0.00 0.00 -6.8E-04 1.0E-03 0.00 0.00
SEX 0.20 0.09 ** 0.05 0.02 ** 0.23 0.11 *
LIVCITY 0.16 0.10 * 0.04 0.02 * 0.32 0.11 ***
WEST -0.08 0.10 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.12
EAST 0.00 0.14 1.8E-03 0.04 0.10 0.17
NORTH 0.04 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.17
EMP 0.05 0.15 9.8E-03 0.04 0.13 0.17
UNEMP -0.03 0.19 -0.01 0.05 0.12 0.22
HIGH 0.87 0.27 *** 0.20 0.06 *** 0.99 0.29 ***
MEDIUM 0.57 0.23 ** 0.13 0.05 ** 0.65 0.24 ***
NOHOUSEH -0.07 0.14 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.14
CHILDREN 0.13 0.17 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.21
RWEALTH 0.26 0.13 ** 0.07 0.03 ** 0.39 0.16 *
FWEALTH 0.21 0.10 ** 0.05 0.03 ** 0.20 0.12 *
LWEALTH 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.12
MBANK_1 0.64 0.47 0.14 0.12 0.53 0.54
MBANK_2 0.77 0.47 0.18 0.12 0.73 0.54
MBANK_3 1.05 0.50 ** 0.25 0.12 ** 1.10 0.57 *
MBANK_4 0.66 0.48 0.15 0.12 0.49 0.55
MBANK_5 1.05 0.56 * 0.25 0.14 * 0.60 0.59
MBANK_6 0.83 0.54 0.19 0.13 0.88 0.62
NOSBANK -0.12 0.10 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.12
BCHOICE 0.25 0.11 ** 0.07 0.03 ** 0.29 0.13 *
BLENGTH 0.00 0.11 3.6E-03 0.03 0.11 0.13
BCLUB 0.24 0.09 *** 0.06 0.02 *** 0.29 0.10 ***





Note 1: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level;  * significant at the 10% level
Note 2: Standard errors based on the robust Huber-White covariance matrix 
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4.3 Robustness  tests 
We have run a number of additional regressions to assess the robustness of the 
documented effect of awareness. In these regressions, the regressors are the same 
as those used in Panel B of Table 4.2. For brevity, we discuss the results only 
informally. 
  Robustness test 1: To address the potential problem of omitted variables, we 
construct a new set of control variables that allows us to better control for 
heterogeneity in the young Finns’ consumption habits (beyond what their basic 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics capture). The new set of controls  
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consist of loan market status (BORROWSi = 1 if currently has outstanding debt), 
use of the Internet (USEINTi = 1 if uses the Internet regularly), and planned 
consumption (SPEND_ci = 1, c = 1, 2, …, 6, in which c indexes planned near-
term spending on education (c = 1), housing (c = 2), traveling (c = 3), computers 
(c = 4), sport or outdoor clothing and equipment (c = 5), and other (c = 6); the 
omitted seventh category is for the respondents without near-term spending 
plans). The use of the new set of controls does not change the main finding: In all 
estimations (O-Probit, QML-Poisson, and Probit) the coefficient of consumer 
awareness is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
  Robustness test 2: Both theoretical and empirical research suggests that 
pricing of the payment media matters for the rate of adoption and use of many 
payment methods (Santomero and Seater, 1996, Humphrey et al, 2001, and 
Rochet and Tirole, 2003, and Borzekowski et al, 2006). While we trust that the 
regressors reflecting consumers’ banking relationships also capture differences in 
the pricing, a further robustness check is in order. As explained in section 2, it is 
typical that at the age of 26, the various banking service packages to which cards 
are often attached cease to be free of charge. Crossing this age may thus trigger 
search and reoptimization. We therefore include a dummy variable equalling one 
for those who are 26 or over. The dummy does not get a significant coefficient.
16 
The coefficient of consumer awareness changes only a little, if at all, and it is 
highly significant in all three cases (O-Probit, QML-Poisson, and Probit). 
  Robustness test 3: To address the concern that it is the maintained definition 
of consumer awareness that drives the results, we use an alternative proxy for ai. 
The alternative proxy equals 1 if the respondent, in addition to acknowledging 
that she had either received or had been offered a lot of information about debit or 
credit cards, ways of paying bills, use of transaction accounts, or borrowing using 
credit cards, indicated in another series of questions that she needed no further 
information about these products and services. The new proxy effectively captures 
consumers whose demand for information is ‘saturated’. Using the new proxy 
reduces slightly the estimated effect of consumer awareness. Nonetheless, the 
effect remains positive and significant in the Probit model at the 5% level and in 
the O-Probit and QML-Poisson at the 10% level. 
  Robustness test 4: As a final robustness test, we use a log-transformed depend 
variable, log(ni), and estimate the model (from Panel B of Table 4.2) using OLS. 
The results do not change. 
 
 
                                                 
16 It is still possible that in the anticipation of reoptimization, consumers start adjusting their 
demand for payment media before they reach the threshold age. But dummies allowing for this 
type of forward-looking behavior gain no significance.  
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5  Is consumer awareness endogenous? 
5.1  Sources of endogeneity 
In this section we relax the assumption of exogenous consumer awareness. As we 
have defined it, consumer awareness reflects consumers’ knowledge about the 
existence and characteristics of payment media. If a consumer’s awareness 
reflects existence, it typically cannot be her choice variable (Guiso and Japelli, 
2005): One can rarely choose to know something that is not known to exist. If a 
consumer’s awareness reflects characteristics of the payment media she knows to 
be available, awareness can be a choice variable – but it does not have to be. 
  The foregoing discussion suggests two main sources of endogeneity of ai. 
First, if awareness is not a consumer’s choice variable, endogeneity can originate 
from the marketing strategies of the issuers of the payment media. Some 
consumers are more likely to be a target of (informative) advertising campaigns 
than others. Endogeneity arises if the propensity to be a target of such a campaign 
is related to consumers’ unobserved propensity to use multiple payment media. 
Second, if a consumer’s awareness is her choice variable, endogeneity can 
originate from self-selection. Self-selection arises if consumers choose their level 
of awareness on the basis of their unobservable propensity to use multiple 
payment media. 
  Signing the direction of the (potential) endogeneity bias is difficult a priori, as 
it can go either way. For example, we cannot identify which consumers in our 
data have parents who use multiple payment media. Such heirs of multihomers 
can be subjected to campaigns of the payment media issuers and simultaneously 
have, say, a lower than average cost of adoption. This source of endogeneity 
would presumably bias the estimated effect of consumer awareness upwards. In 
contrast, a downward bias would probably follow, if the heirs simply receive 
payment media from their parents and are therefore less likely to be a target of 
systematic information provision. 
  As the ability to pay abroad (see section 2) often prompts young Finns to 
acquire a payment card, travelling is another potential source of endogeneity 
where the bias can go either direction. On the one hand, frequent travellers are 
likely to be targets of the campaigns of the payment media issuers and their heavy 
users. An upward bias might therefore follow. On the other hand, many young 
Finns spend long periods abroad, eg as exchange students or working.  
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Consequently, they acquire cards but receive little information from their 




5.2 Estimation  and  instruments 
To relax the assumption of exogenous consumer awareness, use two different 
methods of estimation: The first one corresponds to a standard count regression 
(see column (2) of Table 4.2), but allows for ‘an endogenous treatment effect’ 
(Mullahy, 1997, and Windmeijer and Santos Silva, 1997). The method of 
estimation is GMM (GMM-Poisson). The second method is a recursive Bivariate 
Probit, which is an extension of the Probit model of column (3) of Table 4.2 (see, 
eg Greene, 2008, pp. 823–826): In this two-equation model, the dependent 
variables are USEMANYi and ai and the latter is included in the former’s equation 
as an (endogenous) binary-regressor. We identify the model by excluding some 
variables (the instruments) from the equation for USEMANYi. 
  We use two sets of instruments: The first set consists of two indicators that 
capture whether a respondent had received or had been offered a lot of 
information about some banking products other than those related to paying and 
payment media: The first indicator, INFO_Fi, equals 1 if the information was 
about housing loans, student loans, term deposits, or investing in stocks, mutual 
funds, etc., and is 0 otherwise. The second indicator, INFO_Mi, equals 1 if the 
information was about using banking services via the Internet or via mobile 
phone, and is 0 otherwise. The assumption underlying the instruments is that there 
are advantages associated with the joint marketing and production of financial 
services (see, eg Berger, Humphrey and Pulley, 1996).
18 These instruments are 
valid (ie relevant and exogenous) if they are a determinant of consumer awareness 
(ai) and if the extent to which a consumer is supplied information, for example, 
about term deposits or housing loans, have no direct effect on her propensity to 
use multiple payment media. 
  The second set of instrumental variables is built on the following three 
indicators: FIN_FOi = 1, if the consumer responded that she follows regularly 
banking and financial news in media and = 0 otherwise, FIN_IMi = 1, if she found 
                                                 
17 Self-selection can induce both negative and positive correlation, too. There are, for example, so 
called early adopters who are enthusiastic about new technologies. The early adopters choose to be 
knowledgeable about the payment media and start to use them eagerly. This self-selection results 
in an upward bias. A downward bias would instead follow, if some consumers actively acquire 
information about the payment media because of having (for some unobserved reason) a limited 
access to them. 
18 If there are such advantages, it pays for banks to cross-sell financial products and services and 
pursue ‘one-stop banking’. Cross-selling means that when consumers are informed about a 
banking product, they are simultaneously offered information about other financial services, such 
as payment media.  
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it important to be literate in banking and financial issues and = 0 otherwise, and 
FIN_INi = 1, if she were interested to know more about banking and banking 
services, and = 0 otherwise. These instruments are valid if a consumer’s overall 
interest in financial and banking affairs determines her awareness about payment 
media and if the overall interest has no direct impact on the use of multiple 
payment media. 
  We report below two test statistics to illustrate how these two sets of 
instruments work. The first is an F-test statistic for ‘weak instruments’ (Staiger 
and Stock, 1997), which we implement by testing the joint significance of the 




Table 5.1 reports the results of the estimations that allow for the (potential) 
endogeneity of ai.
19 The exogenous variables are the same as those used in Panel 
A of Table 4.2. The set of instruments is {INFO_Fi, INFO_Mi} in columns (1)–
(2) and {INFO_Fi, INFO_Mi, FIN_FOi, FIN_IMi, FIN_INi} in columns (3) –(4). 
  The results confirm our earlier findings: Consumer awareness is directly 
related to the propensity of consumers to use multiple payment media, as the 
coefficient of ai is positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level 
in all columns.
20 The GMM-Poisson estimates of column (1) suggest, for 
example, that the informed use about 1.2 times more payment media than the less 
informed. Another interpretation can be obtained from the Bivariate-Probit: Using 
the estimated parameters we find that the difference between Prob(USEMANYi 
=1 | ai = 1) and Prob(USEMANYi =1 | ai = 0) is 23.9 percentage points (= 60.0%–
36.1%). This effect is quantitatively significant and confirms that awareness 
increases the likelihood using multiple payment media, particularly the likelihood 
of using a debit card either as a primary or as a secondary method of payment. 
This shows that not controlling for the endogeneity of awareness may result in a 
downward biased estimate. 
 
                                                 
19 The GMM estimations of the Poisson model were implemented using a Gauss programme 
ExpEnd, written by Frank Windmeijer. The programme contains an estimation code for non-linear 
GMM estimation of exponential models with endogenous regressors (for details, see Windmeijer, 
2002). The reported numbers are based on the two-step estimates and multiplicative moment 
conditions (see Mullahy, 1997, Windmeijer and Santos Silva, 1997, and Windmeijer, 2002). 
Somewhat surprisingly, using additive moment conditions yield almost identical results. 
20 The null hypothesis that the residual correlation in the Bivariate-Probit is zero is not rejected at 
the 5% level (p-value of the LR-test is 0.0673).  
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Table 5.1  Regressions results: endogenous ai 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
a 0,18 0,05 *** 0,77 0,22 *** 0,19 0,05 *** 0,77 0,22 ***
INCOME 0,01 3,9E-03 ** 0,04 0,02 * 0,01 3,9E-03 ** 0,04 0,02 *
INCOMESQ -2,0E-04 1,0E-04 * -1,0E-03 5,3E-04 * -2,0E-04 1,0E-04 -1,0E-03 5,3E-04 *
AGE 0,07 0,05 0,10 0,20 0,07 0,05 0,10 0,20
AGESQ -1,0E-03 1,0E-03 -1,4E-04 4,5E-03 -1,0E-03 1,0E-03 -1,4E-04 4,5E-03
SEX 0,07 0,02 *** 0,30 0,10 *** 0,07 0,02 *** 0,30 0,10 ***
LIVCITY 0,04 0,02 * 0,24 0,10 * 0,04 0,02 * 0,24 0,10 *
WEST -0,02 0,03 -0,01 0,11 -0,01 0,03 -0,01 0,11
EAST 0,02 0,04 0,17 0,16 0,02 0,04 0,17 0,16
NORTH 0,02 0,03 0,18 0,15 0,02 0,03 0,18 0,15
EMP 0,02 0,04 0,11 0,16 0,01 0,04 0,11 0,16
UNEMP -0,02 0,05 0,02 0,20 -0,02 0,05 0,02 0,20
HIGH 0,18 0,06 *** 0,83 0,27 *** 0,17 0,06 *** 0,83 0,27 ***
MEDIUM 0,09 0,05 ** 0,53 0,22 * 0,09 0,05 ** 0,53 0,22 *
NOHOUSEH -0,01 0,04 0,01 0,13 -0,01 0,04 0,01 0,13
CHILDREN 0,02 0,04 0,02 0,19 0,02 0,04 0,02 0,19
RWEALTH 0,06 0,03 * 0,31 0,15 * 0,06 0,03 * 0,31 0,15 *
FWEALTH 0,08 0,03 *** 0,26 0,11 * 0,08 0,02 *** 0,26 0,11 *
LWEALTH 0,03 0,03 0,05 0,11 0,03 0,03 0,05 0,11
Instruments:
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Note 5: In the (recursive) Bivariate Probit, the variables that are excluded from the equation for USEMANY are the instruments.
0,12          
Note 3: The instrumented variable in GMM-Poisson is "a".
Note 4: The dependent variable in the second equation of the (recursive) Bivariate-Probit is "a".  
Note 1: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level;  * significant at the 10% level
Note 2: GMM-Poisson based on two-step estimates and multiplicative moment conditions




It seems that weak instruments do not bias the instrumental variable estimations: 
For example, when we estimate a first stage regression by OLS, the value of the 
F-test statistic is 106.24 and 49.05 when the joint significance of {INFO_Fi, 
INFO_Mi} and {INFO_Fi, INFO_Mi, FIN_FOi, FIN_IMi, FIN_INi} is tested, 
respectively.
21 These values exceed clearly the rule-of-thumb threshold (F-statistic 
>10), suggested by Steiger and Stock (1997). The (Sargan) overidentification 
tests, implemented using the GMM-procedure, do not reject the exogeneity of the 
instruments. 
  We can also consider the robustness of the estimations that allow for the 
endogeneity of ai. First we repeat the estimations using the alternative proxy for 
consumer awareness (described in robustness test 3 of Section 4.3). The estimated 
effect increases and is statistically significant at (better than) the 5% level in both 
the GMM-Poisson and recursive Bivariate-Probit estimations. Second, the results 
do not change, when we use the full set of exogenous variables (ie the 
                                                 
21 As for the other determinants of the consumer awareness, our results are less clear cut: Most of 
the demographics (ie the exogenous variables) do not seem to predict it.  
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specification used in Panel B of Table 4.2). For example, when we use recursive 
Bivariate-Probit and the set of instruments is {INFO_Fi, INFO_Mi}, the 
coefficient of ai is positive and highly significant. Third, some may find the 
exclusion restriction underlying {FIN_FOi, FIN_IMi, FIN_INi} more convincing 
than that underlying {INFO_Fi, INFO_Mi}. When we use recursive Bivariate-
Probit and the set of instruments is restricted to {FIN_FOi, FIN_IMi, FIN_INi}, 
the coefficient of ai is positive and highly significant. Finally, the results of Table 




It is widely thought that, holding consumer characteristics and merchant 
acceptance constant, information provision constitutes a major instrument besides 
pricing that affect the use and diffusion of payment media. However, there is little 
evidence on the quantitative importance of consumer information in the market 
for payment media. This paper delivers such evidence using a random sample of 
young Finnish consumers. 
  We find that more than half of the young consumers use more than one 
payment medium. We also find that the better informed a consumer is, the more 
likely she is to use many payment methods. It turns out that the use of multiple 
payment media is closely related to the decision to use debit card in addition to 
cash. However, there is no straightforward link from awareness to debit use: 
Those who use only one payment method use cash irrespective of their awareness 
and while awareness induces a shift towards using many payment methods, the 
shift means that some begin to use debit as their primary method of paying, 
whereas the others begin to use it as their secondary method. The effect of 
awareness on the probability of using multiple payment media is quantitatively 
large, especially if the potential endogeneity of consumer awareness is controlled 
for. 
  Limited participation in the market for modern payment media can have 
important implications for individual welfare, especially if individuals have no 
other access to banking services. Our findings imply that holding income, wealth, 
banking relationship and other consumer characteristics constant, making 
consumers better informed could accelerate the adoption of new payment media, 
such as electronic money and mobile payments. The findings also suggest that 
increases in consumer awareness may have been underlying the rise of debit card 
use around the world. Beyond this, the implications of our findings for the 
payment media industry are less clear-cut. Because consumer multihoming 
intensifies platform competition over merchants (Rochet and Tirole, 2003), 
increasing consumer awareness may be a two-edged sword for the payment media  
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industry. On the one hand, it could be advantageous for the merchants, but on the 
other hand, the issuers of payment media may encounter a dilemma of prisoner 
type: Each issuer can have an incentive to increase consumer awareness of its own 
preferred medium, but the industry as a whole might be better off with a limited 
number of consumers who use multiple payment media. The implications for 
antitrust authorities are also ambiguous. To the extent the perceived failure of 
competition in the market for payment media is due to lack of information, our 
results suggest that improving consumer awareness could be a remedy. However, 
it is well known that improved transparency can also facilitate collusive 
behaviour. 
  Although the positive effect of consumer awareness on use of payment media 
suggests that allocating more resources on marketing new payment media might 
increase their adoption rates, a caveat should be borne in mind. We are 
unfortunately unable to identify whether consumer awareness reflects the 
consumers’ exposure to informative advertising or persuasive advertising, or 
something else (cf. Ackerberg, 2001). We cannot therefore tell what kind of 
information provision or advertising would boost the demand for payment media. 
Isolating the mechanisms through which consumer awareness influences the 




Ackerberg, D A (2001) Empirically distinguishing informative and prestige 
effects of advertising. RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, 316–333. 
 
Amromin, G – Chakravorti, S (2007) Debit card and cash usage: A cross-
country analysis. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, WP 2007-04. 
 
Attanasio, O P – Guiso, L – Japelli, T (2002) The demand for money, financial 
innovation, and the welfare cost of inflation: An analysis of household 
data. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 110, 317–351. 
 
Ausubel, L M (1991) The failure of competition in the credit card market. 
American Economic Review, Vol. 81, 50–81. 
 
Berger, A N – Humphrey, D B – Pulley, L B (1996) Do consumers pay for one-
stop banking? Evidence from an alternative revenue function. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 20, 1601–1621. 
 
Borzekowski, R – Kiser, E K (2006) The choice at the checkout: Quantifying 
demand across payment instruments. Forthcoming in International Journal 
of Industrial Organization. 
 
Borzekowski, R – Kiser, E K – Ahmed, S (2006) Consumers’ use of debit 
cards: patterns, preferences and price response. Forthcoming in Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking. 
 
Carow, K A – Staten, M E (1999) Debit, credit, and cash: Survey evidence on 
gasoline purchases. Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 51, 409–422. 
 
Chakravorti, S (2004) Why has stored-value card not caught on? Journal of 
Financial Transformation, Vol. 12, 39–48. 
 
Evans, D S – Schmalensee, R (2005) Paying with Plastic. Second edition, MIT 
Press. 
 
Frame, S W – White, L J (2004) Empirical studies of financial innovations: 
Lots of talk, little action. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 43, 116–144. 
 
Fusaro, M A (2007) Debit vs credit: A model of self-control with evidence 
from checking accounts. Mimeo, East California University.  
31 
Greene, W H (2008) Econometric Analysis. Sixth Edition, Pearson. 
 
Guiso, L – Jappelli, T (2005) Awareness and stock market participation. 
Review of Finance, Vol. 9, 537–567. 
 
Hayashi, F – Klee, E (2003) Technology adoption and consumer payments: 
Evidence from survey data. Review of Network Economics, Vol. 2, 175–
190. 
 
Humphrey, D B – Pulley, L B – Vesala, J M (2000) The check’s in the mail: 
Why the United States lags in the adoption of cost-saving electronic 
payments. Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 17, 17–39. 
 
Humphrey, D B – Kim, M – Vale, B (2001) Realizing the gains from electronic 
payments: Costs, pricing, and payment choice. Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, Vol. 33, 216–234. 
 
Humphrey, D B (2004) Replacement of cash by cards in U.S. consumer 
payments. Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 56, 211–225. 
 
Hunt, R M (2003) An introduction to the economics of payment card 
networks. Review of Network Economics, Vol. 2, 80–96. 
 
Hyytinen, A – Takalo, T (2004) Multihoming in the market for payment 
media: Evidence from young Finnish consumers. Bank of Finland 
Discussion Papers, 25/2004. 
 
Klee, E (2006a) Families’ use of payment instruments during a decade of 
change in the U.S. payment system. Mimeo, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. 
 
Klee, E (2006b) Paper or plastic? The effect of time on check and debit card 
use at grocery stores. Mimeo, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. 
 
Koskinen, J (2001) Pricing of payment services for private customers in 
Finland. Bank of Finland Discussion Papers, 12/2001. 
 
Lusardi, A – Mitchell, O S (2007) Financial literacy and retirement 
preparedness: Evidence and implications for financial education 
programs. Business Economics, Vol. 42, 35–44. 
  
32 
Mantel, B (2000) Why do consumers pay bills electronically? An empirical 
analysis, Economic Perspectives. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 4th 
Quarter, 32–47. 
 
Mester, L J (2003) Changes in the use of electronic means of payment: 1995–
2001. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, Q3, 18–20. 
 
Mullahy, J (1997) Instrumental-variable estimation of count data models: 
Applications to models of cigarette smoking behavior. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 79, 586–593. 
 
Rochet, J-C – Tirole, J (2003) Platform competition in two-sided markets. 
Journal of European Economic Association, Vol. 1, 990–1029. 
 
Rochet, J-C – Tirole, J (2006) Two-sided markets: A progress report. RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 37, 645–667. 
 
Rysman, M (2007) An empirical analysis of payment card usage. Journal of 
Industrial Economics, Vol. 55, 1–36. 
 
Santomero, A M – Seater, J J (1996) Alternative Monies and the Demand for 
Media of Exchange. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 28, 942–
960. 
 
Stavins, J (2001) Effect of consumer characteristics on the use of payment 
instruments. New England Economic Review, 3, 19–31. 
 
Staiger, D – Stock, J H (1997) Instrumental variables regression with weak 
instruments. Econometrica, Vol. 65, 557–586. 
 
Stix, H (2003) How do debit cards affect cash demand? Survey data evidence. 
Empirica, Vol. 31, 93–115. 
 
Windmeijer, F A G – Santos Silva, J M C (1997) Endogeneity in count data 
models: An application to demand for health care. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, Vol. 12, 281–294. 
 
Windmeijer, F A G (2002) ExpEnd, a Gauss Programme for Non-linear GMM 
Estimation of Exponential Models with Endogenous Regressors for Cross 
Section and Panel Data. The Institute for Fiscal Studies, Department of 
Economics, University of College London, Cemmap Working Paper, CWP 
14/02.  
33 
Wooldridge, J M (1997) Quasi-likelihood methods for count data. In: 
Handbook of Applied Econometrics, Volume II: Microeconomics, edited by 
M H Pesaran and P Schmidt, Blackwell Publishers. 
 




BANK OF FINLAND RESEARCH 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
ISSN 0785-3572, print; ISSN 1456-6184, online 
 
1/2008  Peik Granlund  Regulatory choices in global financial markets – restoring 
the role of aggregate utility in the shaping of market supervision. 2008. 
36 p. ISBN 978-952-462-416-9, print; ISBN 978-952-462-417-6, online. 
 
2/2008  Ari Hyytinen – Tuomas Takalo  Consumer awareness and the use of 
payment media: evidence from Young Finnish consumers. 2008. 34 p. 
ISBN 978-952-462-418-3, print; ISBN 978-952-462-419-0, online. 
 
 
 
 
 Suomen Pankki
Bank of Finland
P.O.Box 160
FI-00101 HELSINKI
Finland